State of Utah, Plaintiff, Appellant v. John Leleae, Defendant, Appellant. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah, Plaintiff, Appellant v. John Leleae,
Defendant, Appellant. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorneys for Appellee; .
Robert K. Heineman; Lisa J. Remal; Attorneys For Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Leleae, No. 980189 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1466
COPY 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE T)F U T A H I 
U R T OF APPEALS 
"3TAH 
DOCUMENT 










Case No. 980189-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated 
assault, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-103 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court, Division I, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, Judge, presiding. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 1 9 1999 
Julia D'Aleeandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 







Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Case No. 980189-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (54 81) 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated 
assault, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-103 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court, Division I, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, Judge, presiding. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION BELOW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 12 
ARGUMENT 14 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE VICTIM SUSTAINED "SERIOUS 
BODILY INJURY." 14 
POINT II. ERRORS IN JURY VOIR DIRE DEPRIVED MR. LELEAE 
OF A FAIR TRIAL. 18 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE 
DEFENSE FROM INTRODUCING THE RELATED PORTIONS OF 
MR. LELEAE'S STATEMENT DURING THE PROSECUTION'S 
PRESENTATION UNDER THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS, WHERE 
THEY WERE NECESSARY TO DISPEL MISCONCEPTIONS 
CREATED BY THE PROSECUTION'S INTRODUCTION OF AN 
ISOLATED. OUT OF CONTEXT FRAGMENT OF THE 
STATEMENT. 21 
A. FACTS UNDERLYING COMPLETENESS CLAIM 21 
B. THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS 23 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE 
DEFENSE FROM PLACING MR. LELEAE'S STATEMENT IN 
PROPER CONTEXT AT THE TIME THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INTRODUCED 27 
D. MR. LELEAE WAS PREJUDICED 29 
POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT SHOULD BE STRICKEN AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 30 
A. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS ACCORDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS. . . 3 0 
page 
B. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT VIOLATES STATE DUE 
PROCESS, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND 
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT FAILS TO 
MEET ITS LEGISLATIVE GOALS IN A REASONABLE 
MANNER 40 
C. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. . 44 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE MR. 
LELEAE THE BENEFIT OF A LESS SEVERE 0-5 YEAR 
SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY IN LIEU OF AN ENHANCED 
MINIMUM TERM OF 6 YEARS UNDER THE SHONDEL 
DOCTRINE 48 
CONCLUSION 50 
ADDENDUM A -- Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
ADDENDUM B -- Portion of Mr. Leleae's statement, R. 402:30-31 
ADDENDUM C -- Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, R. 351-2 
ADDENDUM D -- Gang Enhancement legislative history 
ADDENDUM E -- Old Sentence and Release Guidelines 
ADDENDUM F -- New Sentence and Release Guidelines 
ADDENDUM G -- Order denying defendant's motion challenging 
constitutionality of section 76-3-203.1 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
page 
Allen v. United States. 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 
41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) 20 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96 (Utah App.1993) 2 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989) 44 
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991) 34 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 
2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) 45 
Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake, 817 P.2d 816 
(Utah 1991) 40, 43, 45 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 3 83 
U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) 44 
In re Alberto R., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 348 (1991) 42, 46 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 
25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) 31-33, 35, 36 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 
75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) 45, 47 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) 44 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) 40, 43 
McLaughlin v. Florida. 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 
13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964) 40, 43 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 
2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) 32-34, 36 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State 
Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 17 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 
884 (Utah 1988) 40, 41 
iii 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 
L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) 32, 34, 35 
36 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 
53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) 35, 36 
People v. Biddlecome, 2 P. 194 (Utah 1882) 38 
People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 894 (1991) 42, 46 
Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523 (11th 
Cir. 1986), reinstated en banc, 827 F.2d 1498 
(11th Cir. 1987), aff'd and rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 
L.Ed.2d 445 (1988) 25 
Smith v. Goguen, 415, U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 
39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) 46 
State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) 2, 15 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989) 44 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 19 
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) 48 
State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) 29 
State v. Bruno, 256 P. 109 (Utah 1927) 38 
State v. Cameron Lopes, No. 960551 (Utah, argued 
Nov. 12, 1997) 30 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) 43 
State v. Diaz, 290 P. 727 (Utah 1930) 38 
State v. Dunklev. 39 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1935), overruled 
on other grounds. State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 
188 (Utah 1943) 24 
State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937) 39 
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177 (Utah 1931) 38 
State v. Greene. 94 P. 987 (Utah 1908) 38 
iv 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Hurlev, 741 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1987) 37 
State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 34 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) 19 
State v. James, 89 P. 460 (Utah 1907) 38 
State v. Jensen, 136 P.2d 949 (Utah 1943) 39 
State v. Kent. 945 P. 2d 145 (Utah App. 1997) 4 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 4 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) 20 
State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860 (Utah 1918) 39 
State v. Pav. 146 P. 300 (Utah 1915) 39 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 3 
State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861 (Utah 1998) . . . . 19, 21 
State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994) . . . . 2, 14 
State v. Powasnik. 918 P. 2d 146 (Utah App. 1996) 38 
State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1987) 37, 38 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 34 
State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah), cert, denied. 
510 U.S. 865, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 
(1993) 1, 14 
State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) 4, 13, 14, 
48, 49, 50 
State v. Smith. 817 P.2d 828 (Utah App. 1991) 24 
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991) 2, 14 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 1994) 2, 14 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) 34 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 38 
v 
State v. Viail. 922 P.2d 15 (Utah App. 1996) 3 
State v. Vocrt, 824 P. 2d 455 (Utah App. 1991) 17 
State v. Wedge. 652 P.2d 773 (Or. 1982) 37 
United States v. Carver. 164 U.S. 694 (1897) 4, 23 
United States v. Corrigan, 168 F.2d 641 (2nd Cir. 
1948) 24 
United States v. Haddad. 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir. 
1993) 25 
United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 
1986) 26 
United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51 (2nd Cir. 
1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424, 101 S.Ct. 698, 66 
L.Ed.2d 633 (1981) 25 
United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 
1984) 29 
United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) 27 
United States v. Walker. 652 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 
1981) 26 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 3 0, 3 8 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 1, 19, 30 
31, 33, 36 
40, 44, 46 
49 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 1, 13, 21 
30, 34, 40 
43, 44, 49 
Utah Const, art. I, §12 1,30,38 
39 
Utah Const, art. I, §13 1,30,39 
vi 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 1, 13, 40 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (Supp. 1998) 38 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (3) (b) (1995) 31 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) 31, 39 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) 1, 14, 15, 
16 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) 1, 33, 42, 
45 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995) 38 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) 1, 4, 33, 
39, 44, 45, 
47, 48 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995) 31, 49 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-202(3) (Supp. 1998) 48 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) 1, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq. (1995) 38 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) 1 
Cal. Penal Code § 186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996) 42, 46 
Fed. R. Evid. 106 22, 24-27 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 1, 20 
Utah R. Evid. 106 1 
Utah R. Evid. 611(a) 1, 25, 26 
California Evidence Code § 3 56 25 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Kimball and Boyce, Utah Evidence Law (1996) 27 
vii 
page 
McCormick on Evidence § 56 (1992) 25 
1 Weinsteins Evidence §106-4 (1992 Ed.) 25 
C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Evidence Sec. 5078 (1977 & 1986 Supp.) . . . . 27 
21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 
Sec. 5072, at p. 344 (1977) 26 
viii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 980189-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Utah Const, art. I, § 13 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) 




STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the evidence concerning the element of 
"serious bodily injury" is sufficient to sustain the conviction for 
second degree felony aggravated assault. 
Standard of review. A jury verdict is reviewed viewing 
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 
862, 865 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 
L.Ed.2d 145 (1993). It is appellant's burden to marshal the 
evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Strain, 885 P. 2d 810, 
819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah 
App. 1994). A jury verdict is reversed only if "'the evidence 
. . . is [so] sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" 
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Accord State v. Barlow, 
851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993) . 
Preserved below by motion to dismiss at R. 3 79:73-75; see 
also R.45-49 (pretrial memorandum). 
2. Whether errors in jury voir dire deprived Mr. Leleae 
of a fair trial. 
Standard of Review. 
We review defendant's challenge to the trial 
court's voir dire for an abuse of discretion. Barrett v. 
Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96, 98 (Utah App. 1993) . Although the 
trial court is afforded broad discretion during voir 
dire, the " 'discretion must be exercised in favor of 
allowing discovery of biases or prejudice in prospective 
jurors.' " Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)). 
We will not disturb "a trial court's discretionary 
rejection of voir dire questions" unless the trial court 
abused its discretion and the abuse " 'rose to the level 
of reversible error.'" Id. (quoting Hall, 797 P. 2d at 
472) . Reversible error occurs when, after reviewing the 
totality of the questioning, we conclude that trial 
counsel was not given "'"an adequate opportunity to gain 
the information necessary to evaluate jurors."'" Id. 
(quoting Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 
App.1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439, 448 (Utah 
1988))) . 
2 
State v. Viail, 922 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah App. 1996). 
Preserved below at R. 378:74-6, 401A:252-3. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecution to admit a misleading limited portion of Mr. Leleae's 
statement, while precluding the defense from having related 
portions that were necessary to put the statement in proper context 
admitted at that time. 
Standard of review. The applicability of a legal rule to 
a given fact pattern is reviewed for "correctness," with some level 
of discretion accorded the trial court along a spectrum ranging 
from "de novo" to "broad discretion." State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 
935-9 (Utah 1994) . The amount of discretion to be accorded in 
review of a rule of completeness claim has not yet been decided. 
This court should exercise close review. Pena discussed 
three criteria that are useful in deciding whether broader 
discretion should be accorded the trial court: 
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be 
applied are so complex and varying that no rule 
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts 
can be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the 
legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to 
the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate 
and articulate definitively what factors should be 
outcome determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge 
has observed "facts," such as a witness's appearance and 
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that 
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts. 
Pena, 869 P. 2d at 939. In all cases involving the rule of 
completeness for recorded statements, the facts are straight-
forward and undisputed. The second criterion likewise militates 
for close review, as the rule of completeness is hardly new. E.g. 
3 
United States v. Carver, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897) ("where the whole 
or part of a conversation has been put in evidence by one party, 
the other party is entitled to explain, vary, or contradict it"). 
Finally, demeanor is not at issue and the record is fully adequate 
for review. All three criteria suggest close review is warranted. 
This Court should afford little or no discretion, conducting a "de 
novo" review. 
Preserved below at R. 379:2-7 (in limine argument). The 
State introduced the misleading statement at R. 379:39-40. Mr. 
Leleae's statement is contained in the record at R. 4 02. The 
portion at issue here, pages 402:30-31, is attached as addendum B. 
4. Whether the gang enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1, is unconstitutional? 
Standard of review. Questions of statutory and 
constitutional construction are issues of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993), 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991). 
Preserved below at R. 256-297 (Motion); 369-73 (Order, 
attached as addendum G). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in failing to give Mr. 
Leleae the benefit of a less severe 0-5 year sentence in lieu of a 
gang-enhanced minimum term of 6 years under the Shondel doctrine. 
Standard of review. "Our review under the Shondel rule 
'focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review 
under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular 
deference to the trial court's ruling.'" State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 
4 
145, 146 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Vocrt. 824 P.2d 455, 456 
(Utah App. 1991)). 
Preserved below at R. 288-293. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant John Leleae and codefendants Edwin and Viliamu 
Seumanu were charged by information with attempted homicide, or in 
the alternative second degree felony aggravated assault. R. 7-11 
(information), 207 (information instruction). The trial court 
granted Mr. Leleae' s motion to sever his trial from that of his 
codefendants. R. 106. Trial was held November 25 and 26, 1997. 
See transcripts, R. 378 (11/25/97) , 401A (in chambers voir dire 
which occurs chronologically at 378:60), 379 (11/26/97), and 381 
(partial 11/26/97 transcript which occurs chronologically at 
379:131). The jury returned a verdict of guilty of aggravated 
assault. R. 206, 379:177. Mr. Leleae was sentenced to a gang-
enhanced prison term of 6 to 15 years. R. 351-2. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 10, 1997 Kenny Brems was driving his "decked out" 
1977 Ford pickup with camper shell eastbound on 3500 South just 
past 4800 West at about 9:45 P.M. on Saturday, May 10, 1997. R. 
378:93, --96. He noticed a blue Monte Carlo in the right lane. R. 
3 78:97. He was listening to music and heard two "pops." R. 
378:97-8. He turned down his radio, and in the vicinity of 4400 
West he heard another pop and his rear window shattered. R. 
378:98. As a result of construction, the normally four lane road 
was constricted down to two, with the eastbound traffic moving into 
5 
the westbound lanes. R. 378:98-9. Mr. Brems realized that the 
noise was a gunshot. R. 3 78:102. 
The road was widening back into four lanes. Mr. Brems 
did not want the car behind him to be able to pull alongside, so he 
backed into it. R. 378:102-3. The Monte Carlo was pushed back 
into another car. R. 378:103-4. Mr. Brem's truck stalled, so he 
got out and noticed people in the Monte Carlo getting out of their 
car with a gun. R. 3 78:104. One was wearing shorts and a flannel 
shirt. R. 378:113.1 Mr. Brems identified Mr. Leleae as the person 
who got out with a gun. R. 378:114. Mr. Brems ran down 3500 South 
in front of the westbound traffic, trying to get a car to stop and 
help, and succeeded in getting a motorist to call the police. R. 
378:104-5. 
As Mr. Brems was standing by the stopped motorist, the 
Monte Carlo pulled around his truck, ran over some barricades, and 
struck Mr. Brems in the thigh. He was knocked to the ground. R. 
378:106-7. Someone got out of the Monte Carlo and asked why Mr. 
Brems had backed into their car, and he responded, "because you 
were shooting at me." A second person from the Monte Carlo arrived 
and began hitting Mr. Brems. He "pretty much covered up and kept 
begging for my life at that point." R. 378:107. Mr. Brems 
remembers a woman trying to get the attackers to stop. R. 3 78:108. 
He recalls seeing the plaid flannel shirt again, but could not tell 
if the person wearing the plaid shirt was hitting him or not. "By 
xMr. Leleae was wearing a plaid flannel shirt at the time of 
his arrest, although he was not wearing shorts. See Def. Ex. 1, 3, 
State Ex. 23. 
6 
that time I was getting hit so much that I couldn't tell which one 
was hitting me and which one wasn't . . . " R. 378:115. Mr. Brems 
could not say that Mr. Leleae ever hit him. R. 3 78:138. Mr. Brems 
believes someone else was trying to help him: 
[I]t seemed like one would get a chance to throw a couple 
of punches at me and someone would grab him and another 
would come in. So it was kind of a pull-one-off, one 
jumped on, pull-one-off, another. A rotation type of 
thing . . . 
R. 378:146-7. Mr. Brems identified the persons pictured in 
Exhibits 24 and 25 as the individuals who beat him up. R. 378:148. 
Mr. Brems received minor head injuries and a broken jaw. 
He was treated at Pioneer Hospital, and had surgery on his jaw the 
following Monday at St. Marks Hospital. R. 378:108. His jaw was 
wired shut for about a month and a half. R. 378:110. To assist in 
eating, a tooth or bridge was temporarily removed to allow space 
for a straw. R. 378:109. That tooth or bridge is back now. R. 
378:109-10. After the jaw was unwired, no further care was 
necessary. R. 378:110. His jaw has fully recovered, except that 
Mr. Brems finds it painful to hold a flashlight in his teeth the 
way he did formerly. R. 378:110, --141, --142. Mr. Brems lost 20 
pounds while his jaw was wired shut, but at the time of trial, six 
and a half months after the assault, had gained back all but five 
pounds. R. 378:110-11. 
Kevin Lubbers was driving the vehicle that the Monte 
Carlo was pushed into by Mr. Brems' truck. R. 378:149-50. He 
testified that after the collision, all three occupants of the 
Monte Carlo started chasing Mr. Brems. R. 378:151. He testified 
7 
that the individual with the gun got out the passenger side of the 
Monte Carlo. R. 378:151-2. Mr. Lubbers ran to a nearby Conoco 
station to call the police. R. 378:152. People in the station 
were already calling the police, so he went back outside and saw 
the Monte Carlo start to leave. R. 378:160-1. He went back into 
the street to get a license plate number from the Monte Carlo. R. 
378:152. He watched the Monte Carlo hit a Subaru, then all three 
chased Mr. Brems. From 50 yards away, "it looked like they were 
all pummeling him. You know, I wasn't close enough to see who 
exactly was hitting whom, but I did see that they were all beating 
up on this guy." R. 378:153. 
Earl Bramhall was the driver of the Subaru who Mr. Brems 
stopped to call the police. R. 378:163, --166-9. He estimates the 
Monte Carlo struck Mr. Brems at 2 0 or 3 0 miles per hour. R. 
378:168. Mr. Bramhall described to the police the driver of the 
Monte Carlo at that point in time as having long black wavy hair. 
R. 378:218. Compare State Ex. 24, Def. Ex. 2 (Viliamu Seumanu had 
long black wavy hair). The front seat passengers chased Mr. Brems, 
while the third person threw the handgun back into the Monte Carlo. 
R. 378:170. He later joined the other two where they had dragged 
Mr. Brems to a fence. R. 378:171. Mr. Bramhall testified that all 
three were beating Mr. Brems. R. 378:171. He was 30 to 40 feet 
away. R. 378:183. In addition to the three people from the Monte 
Carlo, there were about four additional people there at the scene 
of the fight trying to separate things. R. 378:184-5. The first 
police officer arrived within 30 or 45 seconds. R. 378:185. 
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Duane Banks was in a vehicle behind Mr. Bramhall's 
Subaru. R. 378:179. He recalls that, after it struck Mr. Brems 
and the Subaru, three or four people got out of the car, pursued 
Mr. Brems, and beat him up against a fence for "a good 5 minutes." 
R. 378:190-2. Mr. Banks testified that it seemed that everyone was 
fighting. R. 378:197. However, in a recorded phone conversation 
with an investigator, he stated that two men were fighting one, and 
two were standing around. R. 381:5. He described one of the men 
just standing around as having a long ponytail, R. 3 81:6, a 
description that fits Mr. Leleae. 
Officer William McCarthy was the first officer on scene. 
R. 379:16. He had just turned east onto 3500 South from 4300 West 
when he received the call of shots fired on the road. He did a U-
turn and drove the one block to the scene. R. 3 78:223. He noticed 
a female leading a white male away from the scene, and three 
Polynesians who appeared to be scuffling with two others wearing 
Delta Airline uniforms. R. 378:223-4, 379:15. He testified that 
State Ex. 24 and 25, along with Def. Ex. 1, were the three 
individuals fighting with the uniformed ones. R. 3 78:224. He had 
all five sit on the curb. R. 378:225. His weapon was drawn. R. 
378:225. The Delta employees were immediately compliant, but it 
took some time to get the others to sit. R. 378:225. He 
transported two of the individuals, including Mr. Leleae, to the 
jail. R. 378:228. He left them in the car alone, with his video 
recorder running. R. 378:229-232, 379:8-10. The Delta employees 
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left the scene without any officer getting their names. R. 379:11, 
--16. 
Officer Julia Jorgenson testified that she responded to 
the 911 call in "about a minute." R. 378:207. She was the second 
officer to arrive. R. 378:214. She testified that there were 
seven people by the fence, five of whom were Polynesian. R. 
378:208-9, --214-5. Two were wearing airline baggage handler 
uniforms. R. 378:209. All five Polynesians were very upset. R. 
378:216. All seven were ordered to sit on the curb. R. 378:216. 
She recovered the revolver, which contained five spent 
casings, from the Monte Carlo. R. 378:210-1. Her initial report 
indicates that the dispatch log identified a 25 year old hispanic 
with a gun wearing a white shirt. R. 378:217. Compare State Ex. 
25 (Edwin Seumanu wearing a white shirt). 
Detective Kevin Nudd interviewed the suspects at the 
police station. Mr. Leleae was interviewed at 2:15 A.M. The 
interview was videotaped. See R. 402 (transcription). Mr. Leleae 
initially indicated that he was merely a bystander. R. 3 79:31, 
--49. "He changed his story as to how he got there and how it was 
that he knew the people that were in the car." R. 379:31. He said 
that after the accident, he took the gun from one of the others and 
put it in the car. R. 379:33-4. The gun went off while he was 
trying to do this. R. 379:34. 
When confronted with the fact that he and Viliamu had 
been recorded in the police car, he agreed to tell the truth. He 
had been drinking beer in a park with Edwin and Viliamu Seumanu. 
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R. 379:36. Edwin owned the Monte Carlo. R. 379:37, --50. Mr. 
Leleae was driving when the shooting started. R. 379:37, --50. 
After they all exited after the first collision, Edwin did the 
driving f rom then on. R. 379:37, — 5 1 . After the second 
collision, Edwin and Viliamu got out of the car and began 
assaulting Mr. Brems. R. 379:38, --52. Mr. Leleae said that he 
tried to break up the fight and pull them off the victim. R. 
379:31-2, --33, --38. Mr. Leleae said he was not involved in 
assaulting Mr. Brems. R. 3 79:52. Detective Nudd was permitted to 
testify that Mr. Leleae said "he didn't want to be a punk and just 
stand there and not do anything" without requiring the prosecution 
to place this statement into proper context. R. 379:3 9-4 0. 
Mr. Leleae !s hands were not swollen or injured in any 
fashion. R.3 79:53. Viliamu's hands were quite swollen with 
scratches on his knuckles. Edwin's hands had a couple little 
scratches on his knuckles. R. 379:64. 
Debra Bryant was the woman who tried to assist Mr. Brems. 
She testified that the Seumanu brothers first set upon Mr. Brems, 
and were involved in the assault from start to finish. R. 3 79:83-
87. They were joined by a third. She testified that this third 
person also struck Mr. Brems in the face. R. 3 79:87. 
Edwin Seumanu testified that he and his brother beat up 
Mr. Brems. R. 379:108. He did not see Mr. Leleae there at that 
time, punching Mr. Brems or otherwise. R. 379:108-9. The two 
Polynesians in uniforms pulled him off Mr. Brems. R. 379:114. 
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Appellant testified that while he was driving the Monte 
Carlo, he accidentally cut off Mr. Brems. R. 381:20-1, --66. Mr. 
Brems responded by passing and cutting off the Monte Carlo. Then 
Edwin Seumanu fired a gun. R. 3 81:22. Prior to that time, Mr. 
Leleae was unaware that there was a gun in the car. R. 3 81:23. 
After Mr. Brems backed into the Monte Carlo, Mr. Leleae got out 
because Viliamu, in the back seat, wanted out of the two door car. 
R. 381:26-7. Mr. Leleae retrieved the gun from Edwin and put it in 
the car. R. 381:29-30. After looking at the damage to the 
vehicles, Edwin jumped into the driver's seat and said, "Get in, 
let's go." R. 381:30-31. Mr. Leleae got in, thinking that they 
would leave the scene. R. 3 81:31. After Edwin swerved and hit Mr. 
Brems and the red Subaru, Edwin and Viliamu got out and started 
beating Mr. Brems. R. 381:36, --80-1. When they got to the fence 
and started beating him more severely, Mr. Leleae got out and tried 
to pull Edwin off of Mr. Brems. R. 381:36-9, --81. He succeeded 
in pulling Edwin off, while the Delta employees pulled off Viliamu. 
R. 381:41-2. Edwin broke the rear windshield wiper on the Subaru, 
and then reengaged Mr. Brems. R. 381:43-4. Mr. Leleae was trying 
to get away from the fight when the police arrived. R. 381:45. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in allowing the charge to go to the 
jury as second degree felony aggravated assault. Where a bone is 
broken and heals in the normal course, the injury only constitutes 
substantial bodily injury, supporting a finding only of third 
degree felony aggravated assault. 
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Mr. Leleae was denied due process in jury selection. The 
trial court refused to ask the panel three questions, from which a 
direct inference of bias could be established. The trial court 
also improperly denied a well taken for-cause challenge. Mr. 
Leleae was not provided sufficient information to intelligently 
exercise his remaining peremptory strikes. 
The trial court erred in refusing to force the 
prosecution to place a fragment of Mr. Leleae's videotaped 
statement into proper context to prevent misleading the jury. The 
rule of completeness, requiring that statements be put in proper 
context at the time they are introduced, was violated. Mr. Leleae 
was prejudiced, and should be granted a new trial. 
The gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional. As a 
matter of state due process, it defines a new offense which should 
be accorded the usual constitutional protections. It fails to have 
a reasonable tendency to further its legislative purpose of 
targeting criminal street gangs in violation of article I, section 
24 and federal equal protection. It violates state and federal due 
process due to its arbitrary and capricious failure to achieve 
those goals. It is unconstitutionally vague as a result of its 
failure to provide sufficient guidance to sentencing judges. It 
should be stricken. 
The trial court erred in refusing to impose a lesser 0-5 
year sentence for the gang enhancement under the Shondel doctrine. 
The elements of conspiracy and those of the gang enhancement 
overlap. Any time the gang enhancement is found to be applicable, 
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the crime of conspiracy has likewise been committed. Under 
Shondel, Mr. Leleae is entitled to the lesser sentence of 0-5 
years. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE VICTIM 
SUSTAINED "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY." 
Mr. Leleae was convicted of second degree felony 
aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1) (a) (Supp. 
1998), requiring proof of intentionally causing serious bodily 
injury. "Serious bodily injury," a term of art, is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (Supp. 1998) as "bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death." 
A jury verdict is reviewed viewing "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the verdict." State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 862, 865 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S. Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993) . It is 
appellant's burden to marshal the evidence supporting the verdict. 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah App. 1994). A jury verdict is 
reversed only if "'the evidence . . . is [so] sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Span, 819 P.2d 
329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
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(Utah 1983)). Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
Fully marshaled, the evidence fails to support the 
verdict. The victim, Kenny Brems, testified at trial as to his 
injuries: 
[ A.] I had some minor head injuries. Wasn't too 
serious and a broken jaw. 
t Q.] Were you treated for that broken jaw? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was that? 
A. I was at [St.] Marks. Went to Pioneer first 
and they couldn't put me in surgery that night. So I had 
to wait until Monday and I had surgery at Saint Mark's 
Q. Tell us about your surgery. 
A. The surgery actually went pretty good. I went 
in and they wired me up and they told me I could spend 
the night. I really didn't care to. So I went back 
home. That was pretty good. The hardest part of all of 
that was just not being able to eat. 
R. 378:108-9. His jaw was wired shut for about a month and a half. 
R. 378:110. To assist in eating, a tooth or bridge was temporarily 
removed to allow space for a straw. R. 378:109. That tooth or 
bridge is back now. R. 378:109-10. After the jaw was unwired, no 
further care was necessary. R. 378:110. His jaw has fully 
recovered, except that Mr. Brems finds it painful to hold a 
flashlight in his teeth the way he did formerly. R. 378:110, -141, 
-142. Mr. Brems lost 20 pounds while his jaw was wired shut, but 
at the time of trial, six and a half months after the assault, had 
gained back all but five pounds. R. 378:110-11. 
For purposes of determining the levels of assault, Utah 
law divides injuries into three categories. The least severe 
category, "bodily injury," is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
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601(3) (Supp. 1998) as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment 
of physical condition." The intermediate category, "substantial 
bodily injury," is defined as "bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical 
pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-601(10) (Supp. 1998). Finally, "serious bodily injury" is 
defined as "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." 
Here, there was no evidence of any injury creating a 
substantial risk of death. Likewise, there was no evidence of any 
disfigurement, protracted or temporary. Thus, the determination of 
whether Mr. Brem's broken jaw constitutes substantial bodily injury 
or serious bodily injury turns on whether the loss or impairment of 
the use of his jaw was temporary or protracted. 
The language used in the bodily injury definitions is 
admittedly imprecise. Protracted impairments can be nonetheless 
temporary. Whether an event is protracted necessarily depends on 
the reference time scale. The statute provides no explicit 
guidance as to what period of time is necessary to constitute a 
protracted loss or impairment, so recourse to statutory 
construction is necessary. 
"One such method of statutory construction is the rule of 
noscitur a sociis, which provides that the meaning of questionable 
words and phrases in a statute be ascertained by reference to words 
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or phrases associated with them." Morton Intf1, Inc. v. Auditing 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590-1 (Utah 1991) . 
"Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, 'of the same kind, ' and its 
companion doctrine of noscitur a sociis, 'it is known from its 
associates,' when general terms follow specific ones, the general 
terms must be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense 
analogous to the preceding specific terms." State v. Vogt, 824 
P.2d 455, 458 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, in Vogt this Court 
determined 
This wording of the lewdness involving a child statute 
proscribes the exposing of a child to sexual activity, 
and the general term 'any other act of gross lewdness' is 
restricted to a sense analogous to such wording. 
Id. "[T]he general term ' any other act of gross lewdness' found in 
section 76-9-702.5 must be interpreted as referring to acts of 
equal gravity as those acts prohibited in the statute . . . " Id. 
With these principles in mind, in assessing the meaning 
of protracted in the definition of "serious bodily injury," the 
gravity of the protracted loss or impairment of the function of a 
body member or organ must be comparable to the gravity of a 
"serious permanent disfigurement" or an injury that "creates a 
substantial risk of death." Similarly, in assessing whether a loss 
or impairment is merely temporary so as to constitute "substantial 
bodily injury," the gravity of the loss or impairment of function 
must be comparable to the gravity of "protracted physical pain" or 
"temporary disfigurement." 
Here, the trial court erred in ruling that a broken jaw 
was of comparable gravity to a permanent serious disfigurement or 
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an injury creating a substantial risk of death. Instead, the 
gravity of the injury is squarely comparable to protracted physical 
pain or temporary disfigurement. At the time of trial, Mr. Brem's 
jaw was completely healed, except that holding a flashlight in his 
mouth causes him pain. Notably, to the extent this pain is 
considered protracted physical pain, it likewise places this injury 
in the "substantial bodily injury" category. In sum, any broken 
bone which is not life threatening and heals normally in the usual 
time frame should be considered a temporary loss or impairment of 
function, making the injury "substantial bodily injury." Because 
Mr. Brem's injury was not "serious bodily injury," the trial court 
erred in allowing the second degree felony aggravated assault 
charge to go to the jury. This Court should vacate the second 
degree felony conviction, and enter judgment for third degree 
felony aggravated assault. 
POINT II. ERRORS IN JURY VOIR DIRE DEPRIVED MR. 
LELEAE OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
During voir dire, the trial court refused to ask three 
questions requested by defendant: 
26. If Mr. Leleae were to testify, would you give his 
testimony the same weight and credit that you would 
give to any other witness? 
41. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the 
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the 
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
you found that a majority of the jurors believed 
the defendant was guilty, would you change your 
verdict only because you were in the minority? 
49. You will later be instructed by the judge that the 
identification of a person as the perpetrator of a 
crime is an expression of belief or impression by 
the witness, and that many factors affect the 
accuracy of the identification. Do any of you 
believe that an eyewitness can never make a 
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mistake? Would any of you be unable to follow the 
judge's instructions about looking at various 
factors which could affect the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification? 
R. 378:74 (request), 139-146 (proposed questions). 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 
requires that jurors be questioned concerning areas of possible 
bias. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 867 (Utah 1998). " [W] hether the trial 
court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire turns on 
whether, considering the totality of the questioning, counsel was 
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary 
to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 
1988) . "The trial court must possess discretion in this context 
because of the multitude of factual variations that may affect the 
proper scope of questioning. That discretion is strictly limited 
where the questions are directly related to bias and prejudice, but 
increases as the directness of that relation decreases or, in some 
instances, where the question unduly intrudes upon the privacy of 
the jurors." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868. 
Each of the questions propounded was direct, appropriate, 
and necessary for discovering potential bias. Given that Mr. 
Leleae in fact testified, see R. 381:13-120, it was critical that 
the defense be able to assess whether jurors would accord that 
testimony the weight it deserved. Being directly related to bias 
against the defendant and his testimony, the trial court had little 
or no discretion to exclude the question. 
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Likewise, an incorrect answer to either of the other 
questions would support a direct inference of bias, and either 
support a for-cause challenge or require rehabilitation. The 
criminal law requires that individual jurors exercise their 
independent judgment in determining guilt or innocence, and not 
surrender their individual views of conscience. Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 157, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) 
("the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each 
individual juror"). The trial court should have determined that 
each juror was capable and willing to undertake this burden. 
Similarly, eyewitness identification issues were important in this 
case, and the trial court should have inquired on this topic. 
The trial court also erred in failing to strike juror 
Steven Wright. Mr. Wright had daily interaction with Detective 
Nudd for a month and a half when he was an explorer some 14 or 15 
years earlier. Det. Nudd was a physical education instructor for 
the program. Mr. Wright found the program very challenging 
physically. "I know at the time it was hard because he was pushing 
us to exercise and stuff real hard at the time, but no, not now. 
I got over it right after. I realized it was something good that 
happened to me and not bad." R. 401A:265. As a result of this 
positive experience with Det. Nudd, it is likely that Mr. Wright 
would give the detective's testimony undue credit. Under U.R.Cr.P. 
18(e)(4), he should have been stricken. 
"[T]he importance of adequate voir dire has been 
heightened by [the] decision in State v. Menzies, 889 P. 2d 393 
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(Utah 1994) . " Piansiaksone, 954 P. 2d at 868. Appellant was forced 
to use his first peremptory strike on this juror. R. 200. As a 
result, each of the remaining peremptory strikes became that much 
more important. Mr. Leleae was deprived of an opportunity to 
develop facts to support a challenge for cause for jurors who were 
unwilling or unable (1) to accord Mr. Leleae's testimony 
appropriate weight, (2) to hold fast to good faith beliefs of 
conscience, or (3) to correctly follow the law set forth in the 
Long instruction. Mr. Leleae was deprived of one peremptory strike 
by the trial court's erroneous for-cause ruling, and was not 
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary 
to evaluate jurors so as to intelligently exercise the remaining 
three strikes due to the trial court's failure to ask questions 26, 
41, and 49. Mr. Leleae's right to due process was violated. This 
Court should reverse. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE 
DEFENSE FROM INTRODUCING THE RELATED PORTIONS 
OF MR. LELEAE'S STATEMENT DURING THE 
PROSECUTION'S PRESENTATION UNDER THE RULE OF 
COMPLETENESS, WHERE THEY WERE NECESSARY TO 
DISPEL MISCONCEPTIONS CREATED BY THE 
PROSECUTION'S INTRODUCTION OF AN ISOLATED, OUT 
OF CONTEXT FRAGMENT OF THE STATEMENT. 
A. FACTS UNDERLYING COMPLETENESS CLAIM. 
After his arrest, Mr. Leleae gave a lengthy statement to 
Detective Kevin Nudd, which concluded with the following: 
JL: You know what, you tell the truth, you doin something you 
don't feel like doing, like this situation when I was 
driving and you know something is wrong but you can't do 
nothing about it because you in it already, you know. 
That's the only feeling that was hitting me when they 
were beating up the man, you know, when I see the two of 
them going at it beating up a man not even a man just 
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another person too, another white man[] with long hair, 
it wasn't really hard for me to try to hold them back 
because they are my friends and when they beat the man 
down, you know what my feelings was, you know, should I 
help them beat up the man or should I just stand here, I 
don't want to be a punk and just stand there and not 
doing nothing and that was the only thing on my mind. If 
I wasn't the one that was shooting, I wasn't the one 
driving, I would probably of beat the man. I know since 
I tell the truth, that everybody over there that would 
recognize me from when they were beating up the man, they 
know that I wasn't laying a hand on nobody that I was 
trying to hold my boy back, the big one, the one owned 
the car. This was enough you know other people around. 
I know that I was drunk you know. But then again I know 
what I was doing. 
KN: Well I appreciate you telling us the truth. It makes it 
easier to figure things out because things just weren't 
fitting together. John at this time, we are going to go 
back and talk to one of the other guys to see if he will 
come clean and talk to us. We are going to put you back 
into the room for a few minutes and then we will let you 
know what we are going to do. O.K.? 
This will conclude this interview the time is 0252 hours. 
R. 402:30-31 (attached as addendum B). 
The prosecution filed a motion in limine to allow it to 
admit selected portions of this statement, while simultaneously 
precluding the defense from introducing the surrounding portions to 
provide a non-misleading context. R. 379:2-7. The trial court 
granted the motion, simultaneously denying Mr. Leleae's motion to 
admit other portions: 
THE COURT: I am going to deny the request for 
admission under 106. First of all, based upon its 
express language I am not satisfied that it applies. 
Even if it were to apply, I am of the opinion that the 
competing interest of -- well, let me restate that. 
That the nature of self-serving statements do 
not persuade this court that I ought to exercise 
discretion under Rule 106 and allow any remaining 
portions of the statement to come in because of fairness. 
In this court's view at this point, the fairness argues 
in favor of keeping out the self-serving statements. 
R. 379:6-7. 
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The prosecutor elicited testimony concerning Mr. Leleae!s 
statement from Detective Nudd as follows: 
Q. Toward the end of the interview, Det. 
Nudd, what did John say his feelings were about what was 
going on? 
A. He told me that after the shooting 
started, felt there just wasn't anything he could do, so 
he continued in the car with them and them once the 
accident happened, he said that he was with them, and 
once they started assaulting him, he said he felt like he 
didn't want to be a punk and support his friends, but 
didn't know whether or not to do anything to the guy. 
Q. Did he say he didn' t want to be a punk and 
just stand there and not do anything? 
A. Yes. 
R. 379:39-40. Defense counsel was precluded from introducing 
surrounding portions at that time to bring this statement into 
proper context. 
B. THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS. 
The rule of completeness has longstanding lineage. Over 
a century ago the Supreme Court stated: 
If it were competent for one party to prove this 
conversation, it was equally competent for the other 
party to prove their version of it. . . . [W]here the 
whole or a part of a conversation has been put in 
evidence by one party, the other party is entitled to 
explain, vary, or contradict it. 
United States v. Carver, 164 U.S. 694, 696-7 (1897). 
[I] f one party to litigation puts in evidence part of a 
document, or a correspondence or a conversation, which is 
detrimental to the opposing party, the latter may 
introduce the balance of the document, correspondence or 
conversation in order to explain or rebut the adverse 
inferences which might arise from the fragmentary or 
incomplete character of the evidence introduced by his 
adversary. [] The rationale of the doctrine of 
completeness has been stated by Professor Wigmore: 'To 
look at a part (of an utterance) alone would be to obtain 
a false notion of the thought. . . . One part cannot be 
separated and taken by itself without doing injustice, by 
producing misrepresentation'; and again, 'possibilities 
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of error lie in trusting to a fragment of an utterance 
without knowing what the remainder was' ; consideration of 
the whole is needed 'to avoid the danger of mistaking the 
effect of a fragment. ' [] 
United States v. Corricran, 168 F.2d 641, 645 (2nd Cir. 1948) 
(footnote cites omitted). 
Utah case law is in accord. In State v. Dunklev, 3 9 P. 2d 
1097, 1109 (Utah 1935), the Supreme Court held regarding 
confessions that "where the statement contains both disserving and 
self-serving statements, the whole must be admitted and considered 
by the jury." 
In view of all this, how stands the case? 
Certainly the court could not properly have admitted in 
evidence only the disserving statements by excluding the 
self-serving, and, when both were admitted, the jury 
could not be permitted to do what the court could not 
have done, consider only the disserving and reject the 
self-serving, or to believe the disserving and disbelieve 
the self-serving, unless there is something either 
intrinsic or extrinsic to render the self-serving 
questionable or doubtful or inconsistent. 
The rule of completeness is currently embodied in Rule 
106, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may 
require the introduction at that time of any other part 
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in 
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
There are no Utah cases discussing this rule. However, this rule 
is identical to the federal rule, and decisions under that rule are 
persuasive authority. State v. Smith, 817 P. 2d 828, 829 (Utah App. 
1991) ("The Utah rule is identical to its federal counterpart" and 
therefore federal interpretations of the rule are persuasive."). 
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As the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 106 
makes clear, " [t]he rule is an expression of the rule of 
completeness." The Note further describes the purposes of the 
rule: 
The rule is based on two considerations. The 
first is the misleading impression created by taking 
matters out of context. The second is the inadequacy of 
repair work when delayed to a point later int the trial. 
See McCormick § 56; California Evidence Code § 356. 
Although Rule 106 addresses only writings and recordings, 
the rule of completeness is still applicable to oral statements, 
whether recorded or not: 
As we see it, by its terms the rule refers to 
written or recorded statements. However Rule 611(a) 
gives the district courts the same authority with respect 
to oral statements and testimonial proof. See Weinsteins 
Evidence Vol. 1, 106-4 (1992 Ed.) 
United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Alternatively, the prosecution's questioning concerning the 
statement was "tantamount to the introduction of the [transcribed 
statement] into evidence." Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 
F.2d 1523, 1529 n.ll (11th Cir. 1986) , reinstated en banc, 827 F.2d 
1498 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd and rev'd in part on other grounds, 
488 U.S. 153, 109 S. Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988) ; accord United 
States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2nd Cir. 1979) (rule 106 
implicated where "notes had been used extensively and quoted from" 
during examination of witness), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424, 101 S.Ct. 698, 
66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). 
When confronted with a completeness claim, the trial 
court has two options: 
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If otherwise inadmissible evidence is necessary to 
correct a misleading impression, then either it is 
admissible for this limited purpose by force of Rule 106, 
the view taken in 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice 
and Procedure Sec. 5072, at p. 344 (1977), or, if it is 
inadmissible (maybe because of privilege), the misleading 
evidence must be excluded too. 
United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986). 
The prosecution's contention at R. 3 79:5 that the 
defendant should instead be forced to take the stand is not well 
taken: 
In criminal cases where the defendant elects 
not to testify, as in the present case, more is at stake 
than the order of proof. If the Government is not 
required to submit all relevant portions of prior 
testimony which further explain selected parts which the 
Government has offered, the excluded portions may never 
be admitted. Thus there may be no "repair work" which 
could remedy the unfairness of a selective presentation 
later in the trial of such a case. 
United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 1981). This 
is not a case of the defendant attempting to manipulate matters to 
his own benefit. Rather, the prosecution was attempting to mislead 
the jury by admitting Mr. Leleae's statement about not wanting "to 
be a punk and just stand there and not doing nothing" in isolation 
and out of context so that the jury would draw an incorrect 
inference from it. 
Evidence needed to correct the misleading impression is 
admissible irrespective of whether it would otherwise be 
admissible: 
The structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates 
that Rule 106 is concerned with more than merely the 
order of proof. Rule 106 is found not in Rule 611, which 
governs the "Mode and Order of Interrogation and 
Presentation," but in Article I, which contains rules 
that generally restrict the manner of applying the 
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exclusionary rules. See C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence Sec. 5078, at 376 (1977 
& 1986 Supp.). Moreover, every major rule of exclusion 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence contains the proviso, 
"except as otherwise provided by these rules, "C] which 
indicates "that the draftsmen knew of the need to provide 
for relationships between rules and were familiar with a 
technique for doing this." Id. There is no such proviso 
in Rule 106, which indicates that Rule 106 should not be 
so restrictively construed. See id. [] 
Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function 
only by permitting the admission of some otherwise 
inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness 
that the proffered evidence should be considered 
contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the 
specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates 
difficulties for both litigants and the trial court. 
United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(footnotes omitted). Accord Kimball and Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 
at 1-33 (1996) ("if the objectionable evidence (for example, 
hearsay) is needed to provide context and understanding, fairness 
seems to require its admission"). The State's argument in the 
trial court that Rule 106 does not control over the hearsay rule, 
R. 3 79:5-6, is contrary to law and must be rejected. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE 
DEFENSE FROM PLACING MR. LELEAE*S 
STATEMENT IN PROPER CONTEXT AT THE TIME 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED. 
Mr. Leleae's defense was that, while he was present at 
the scene, he did not participate in assaulting Mr. Brems. 
Instead, he attempted to get the Seumanu brothers to stop the 
assault. Mr. Brems could not positively identify Mr. Leleae as 
being one of the attackers. R. 378::115, --138. Other 
eyewitnesses were some distance away and may have mistaken the role 
of Mr. Leleae in the tumultuous situation. 
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The prosecution elicited evidence concerning Mr. Leleae's 
statement through Detective Nudd: 
Q. Did he say he didn't want to be a punk and 
just stand there and not do anything? 
A. Yes. 
R. 379:39-40. This statement was offered as an invitation to the 
jury to draw an inference that, because Mr. Leleae did not want to 
"be a punk and just stand there," he must have participated in the 
brutal assault of Mr. Brems. From the isolated fragment of Mr. 
Leleae's statement that the prosecution put before the jury, no 
other inference could be drawn. 
However, this inference is incorrect. Taken in context, 
the import of Mr. Leleae's statement was that, because he did not 
want to stand around and do nothing, he actively attempted to get 
the Seumanu brothers to stop assaulting Mr. Brems: 
JL: You know what, you tell the truth, you doin something you 
don't feel like doing, like this situation when I was 
driving and you know something is wrong but you can't do 
nothing about it because you in it already, you know. 
That's the only feeling that was hitting me when they 
were beating up the man, you know, when I see the two of 
them going at it beating up a man not even a man just 
another person too, another white man[] with long hair, 
it wasn't really hard for me to try to hold them back 
because they are my friends and when they beat the man 
down, you know what my feelings was, you know, should I 
help them beat up the man or should I just stand here, I 
don't want to be a punk and just stand there and not 
doing nothing and that was the only thing on my mind. If 
I wasn't the one that was shooting, I wasn't the one 
driving, I would probably of beat the man. I know since 
I tell the truth, that everybody over there that would 
recognize me from when they were beating up the man, they 
know that I wasn't laying a hand on nobody that I was 
trying to hold my boy back, the big one, the one owned 
the car. This was enough you know other people around. 
I know that I was drunk you know. But then again I know 
what I was doing. 
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R. 402:30-31 (emphasis added). The jury correctly inferred that 
Mr. Leleae was spurred to action, but was completely misled as to 
the nature of that action. The remainder of the statement was 
necessary to reveal the true tenor of Mr. Leleae's statement and 
avoid misleading the jury: 
Under this doctrine of completeness, a second writing may 
be required to be read if it is necessary to (1) explain 
the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in 
context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) 
insure a fair and impartial understanding. 
United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3rd Cir. 1984) (citing 
United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir.1982)). For each 
and every of these reasons, the remainder of Mr. Leleae's statement 
was necessary at that time. Viewed fairly in context, Mr. Leleae's 
statement indicates that he was spurred to action and attempted to 
break up the assaultive behavior of the Seumanus. 
D. MR. LELEAE WAS PREJUDICED. 
Confessions have been called "the most compelling 
possible evidence of guilt." State v. Bolsinger, 699 P. 2d 1214, 
1222 (Utah 1985) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 86 
S.Ct. 1602, 1623-4, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 685, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1707, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting))). The trial court's action changed the 
perceived meaning and effect of Mr. Leleae's statement from the 
exculpatory statement that it was into a highly incriminating 
confession. The jury was misled, and the trial rendered unfair. 
The evidence of Mr. Leleae's complicity was thin at best. 
He was the only one that had no cuts, bruising, or swelling of his 
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knuckles, R. 3 79:53, --67, strong circumstantial evidence that he 
threw no punches. Given the unconvincing character of the other 
evidence, it is likely that the jury convicted based on its 
perception that Mr. Leleae confessed that "he didn't want to be a 
punk and just stand there and not do anything." No amount of 
subsequent repair work could alter the impression left with the 
jurors that Mr. Leleae had confessed. Absent the court's improper 
ruling on the completeness issue, it is reasonably likely that the 
jury would have acquitted. 
POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.2 
A. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS ACCORDED 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantee defendants 
the right to a jury trial. A jury, rather than the trial court, 
should make the factual findings concerning the applicability of 
the gang enhancement. Under article I, section 7 and the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments, defendants have a due process right to be 
presumed innocent until the elements of an offense are proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Article I, section 13 guarantees the 
right to a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause on all 
elements of an offense prior to being bound over for trial. 
2These constitutional challenges are currently pending before 
the Supreme Court in State v. Cameron Lopes, No. 960551 (Utah, 
argued Nov. 12, 1997). 
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The gang enhancement statute states that " [t]his section 
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense." The legislature is elevating 
form over substance -- in fact a new offense, with an additional 
element, has been created. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) 
defines elements of criminal offenses as the conjunction of "[t]he 
conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, 
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense" and 
" [t]he culpable mental state required." The conduct proscribed in 
the gang enhancement satisfies both prongs of this element test. 
"In concert" describes both the proscribed conduct and attendant 
circumstances of the offense. The mental state of the primary 
offense likewise must be shown. The gang enhancement statute is 
not an enhancement at all; it defines new offenses with the added 
element of "in concert with two or more persons." 
Indeed the new offenses defined by the gang enhancement 
have always existed. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995) sets forth 
the elements of conspiracy. Of course, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3) (b) (1995) has heretofore precluded conviction of both an 
offense and conspiracy to commit that offense. The gang 
enhancement achieves an end run around this prohibition, and 
provides for a longer sentence than a separate conviction for 
conspiracy would. See argument in Point V, infra at 48. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, , 25 
L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970) definitively held that "the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
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beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged." In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) the court held it was 
impermissible for the State of Maine to require a defendant to 
prove by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion to 
reduce his conviction from murder to manslaughter: 
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute 
a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine 
many of the interests that decision sought to protect 
without effecting any substantive change in its law. It 
would only be necessary to redefine the elements that 
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as 
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. 
Mullanev, 421 U.S. at 698. 
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 
91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the court upheld a Pennsylvania scheme 
whereby a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence is imposed if the trial 
judge finds by a preponderance that the defendant visibly possessed 
a firearm during the commission of the offense. The court noted 
that there is little risk of error in the trial court making such 
a determination. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84. The court reiterated 
that there are constitutional limits to a State's power to redefine 
crimes in circumvention of Winship, but declined to specify the 
precise confines of those limits. Id. at 86-7. However, the 
court noted, " [t]he statute gives no impression of having been 
tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88. 
While the "tail wagging the dog" metaphor used by the 
Supreme Court is admittedly imprecise, the sense of what is meant 
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is clear. Sentencing considerations must involve additional facts 
which are few in number, capable of easy determination, and not 
subject to any appreciable risk of error in their determination. 
The gang enhancement statute exceeds the permissible 
limits of offense definition allowed by the due process clause, and 
should be stricken as violative of the due process clause. Unlike 
the "visible possession" finding at issue in McMillan, the "in 
concert" finding here involves complicated determinations of the 
intent of other individuals, who need not be apprehended or even 
identified. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(b). 
One of the motivating concerns in Winship was the need 
for accurate fact determinations in criminal cases. 397 U.S. at 
363. The gang enhancement statute undermines this paramount goal 
and invites perfunctory application of the enhancement without the 
careful, considered fact-finding it properly warrants. 
Proof of "in concert" activity requires proof that two 
other actors committed a crime in conjunction with the primary 
offense. The enhancement is only applicable if each additional 
actor "commits the offense, solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1995), as applicable through § 76-3-203.1(1)(b). 
Of the three (or more) criminal actors, the State is only 
required to prove to the jury that one is guilty. The enhancement 
statute attempts to transform proof that the other two (or more) 
are culpable into a sentencing function. Two thirds of the 
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required facts are relegated to the sentencing court's perfunctory 
determination that the enhancement is applicable. Only one third 
of the necessary facts are proven to the jury. The statute here 
falls outside the rule of McMillan, and must be stricken. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not hesitated to depart from 
federal standards when those standards become unworkable.3 Current 
federal law addressing offense definition and what constitutes an 
element of a given offense has become unworkable and should be 
rejected. 
In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 
L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a Maine statute 
providing that malice aforethought would be presumed and an 
intentional and unlawful homicide is murder unless the defendant 
proved by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. The Court conducted an historical review of 
murder and manslaughter and observed: 
First, the fact at issue here -- the presence or absence 
of heat of passion on sudden provocation -- has been, 
almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, 
the single most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring 
3E.g. , State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) 
(rejecting some aspects of federal model for analyzing eyewitness 
identifications); Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1991) (recognizing due process rights in parole hearings); 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-8 (Utah 1991) (rejecting 
federal doctrine that bank depositors have no expectation of 
privacy in bank records); see also State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 
271-2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, noting federal law 
had become a "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of 
contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions," and 
advocating separate state constitutional construction). 
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the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving 
this fact. 
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696. The court concluded that "By drawing 
this distinction [between murder and manslaughter] , while refusing 
to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests found 
critical in Winship." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698. A unanimous 
court reversed. 
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 
L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), five members of the Court reached a result the 
practical result of which is directly contrary to that in Mullaney. 
The New York statute at issue required the defendant to prove the 
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a 
preponderance to reduce a second degree murder charge to 
manslaughter. The Court characterized the defense as "a 
considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of 
passion on sudden provocation . . . " Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202. 
The Court further characterized the definition of murder at issue 
in Mullaney as including the absence of provocation. Patterson, 
432 U.S. at 215-6. 
The dissent took the majority to task over the 
inconsistency with Mullaney: 
The Court manages to run a constitutional boundary line 
through the barely visible space that separates Maine's 
law from New York's. It does so on the basis of 
distinctions in language that are formalistic rather than 
substantive. 
. . . Winship was violated [in Mullaney] only 
because this fact -- malice -- was "presumed" unless the 
defendant persuaded the jury otherwise by showing that he 
acted in the heat of passion." New York, in form 
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presuming no affirmative fact against Patterson, [] and 
blessed with a statute drafted in the leaner language of 
the 20th century, escapes constitutional scrutiny 
unscathed even though the effect on the defendant of New 
York's placement of the burden of persuasion is exactly 
the same as Maine' s. . . . 
With all respect, this type of constitutional 
adjudication is indefensibly formalistic. A limited but 
significant check on possible abuses in the criminal law 
now becomes an exercise in arid formalities. What 
Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits 
a free society places on its procedures to safeguard the 
liberty of its citizens becomes a rather simplistic 
lesson in statutory draftsmanship. 
. . . This decision simply leaves us without 
a conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from 
legitimate legislative adjustments of the burden of 
persuasion in criminal cases." 
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 221-5 (Powell, J., joined by Brennan and 
Marshall, JJ. , dissenting) . Fundamental constitutional protections 
are now relegated under federal due process to the vagaries of 
draftsmanship in the state legislatures. 
In dissent from McMillan, Justice Stevens sets forth a 
practical and workable test: 
Once a State defines a criminal offense, the 
Due Process Clause requires it to prove any component of 
the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a 
special stigma and a special punishment beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting4) . Under article 
I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, this Court should adopt this 
straightforward test. The conduct of the other actors should be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury before the gang 
enhancement is applicable. 
4Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, dissenting, join in 
this aspect of Justice Stevens' dissent. 477 U.S. at 94. 
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Oregon has followed this approach. In State v. Wedge, 
652 P. 2d 773 (Or. 1982), the Oregon Supreme Court stated that 
"facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which 
characterize the defendant are for the sentencing judge." 652 P. 2d 
at 777. Wedge involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a 
firearm in the commission of an offense. The Oregon court found: 
Although the challenged statute is denominated 
an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new 
crime. . . . The legislature cannot eliminate 
constitutional protections by separating and relabeling 
elements of a crime. 
Wedge. 652 P.2d at 778. 
Arizona likewise has drawn distinctions based on whether 
the enhancing factor under consideration involves additional 
elements of culpability or merely concerns a status. In State v. 
Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 263 (Ariz. 1987) the Arizona court rejected 
the contention that an enhancement based on release status required 
a jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Parole 
status has traditionally been a factor considered in sentencing, 
has never been an element of a crime in Arizona, and involved no 
determination of the conduct or mental state of the defendant. 
Proof involves objective evidence with little risk of error. 
However, in State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1987), the court 
found that the same enhancement based on escape status required a 
jury determination: 
Thus, unlike the release status considered in 
Hurley, escape is a crime in itself. The crime of escape 
contains its own elements: the state must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the 
requisite intent to escape. In this case, Powers is 
receiving additional punishment based on alleged criminal 
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conduct -- escape -- for which no jury has found him 
guilty. 
Powers, 742 P.2d at 795. 
Requiring a jury determination of the "in concert" 
element would bring this area of law into accord with similar 
provisions in Utah. Utah law provides for a jury determination by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for both the dangerous weapon 
enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995)) and under the 
habitual criminal statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq. 
(1995)). Under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(4) (Supp. 1998) (providing 
for enhanced penalties for drug offenses within 1000 feet of 
schools, churches, parks, and the like), that the activity occurred 
within 1000 feet is an element of the crime that must be found by 
the jury. State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah App. 1996). In 
capital cases, aggravating circumstances must be proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 577-80, 
585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, JJ. , in 
separate opinions). The gang enhancement serves identical 
purposes; the same protections should apply. 
Article I, section 12 and the sixth amendment guarantee 
the right to jury trial. It is well established that the jury is 
provided with the sole ability to judge the facts in criminal 
matters and to weigh the evidence. The law prohibits the judge 
from invading that province. State v. Green, 6 P. 2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1931); State v. Diaz, 290 P. 727, 731 (Utah 1930); State v. Bruno, 
256 P. 109, 110 (Utah 1927); State v. Greene, 94 P. 987, 989 (Utah 
1908); State v. James, 89 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1907); People v. 
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Biddlecome, 2 P. 194 (Utah 1882). The gang enhancement violates 
article I, section 12 by providing that the trial court, rather 
than a jury, is to determine whether the crime was committed in 
concert with two or more others. 
Article I, section 13 guarantees defendants a preliminary 
hearing on all offenses. The gang enhancement statute, by 
designating itself an enhancement rather than a substantive 
offense, deprives defendants of preliminary hearings on the issue 
of whether there is probable cause that the crime was committed in 
concert with two or more others. The accused's right to a 
preliminary hearing is a substantial one. State v. Pay, 146 P. 
300 (Utah 1915). The Supreme Court has ruled that unless a criminal 
defendant is subjected to a preliminary examination for the 
violation of a criminal statute, the prosecution is not authorized 
to continue with a proceeding relating to the violation. State v. 
Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (Utah 1943); State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 
196, 199 (Utah 1937); State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860, 861 (Utah 1918). 
The gang enhancement violates article I, section 13 by eliminating 
this fundamental right to a preliminary hearing. 
The legislature's declaration in § 76-3-203.1 (5) (a) 
notwithstanding, the gang enhancement creates a separate offense by 
proscribing conduct and attendant circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-501(2). The constitutional protections applicable to elements 
of criminal offenses, including the presumption of innocence, right 
to an impartial jury, and right to a preliminary hearing, must be 
applied to the "in concert" element of the gang enhancement. 
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B. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT VIOLATES STATE DUE 
PROCESS, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND 
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT FAILS 
TO MEET ITS LEGISLATIVE GOALS IN A 
REASONABLE MANNER. 
Under article I, sections 7 and 24 of the Utah 
Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the gang enhancement is unconstitutional. 
The gang enhancement fails the uniform operation of laws 
test: 
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. [cites omitted] Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different treatment 
given the classes must be based on differences that have 
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. [cites omitted] If the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is 
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination is 
unreasonable. [cite omitted] 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added); 
accord Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 
1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 
(Utah 1988); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 
S.Ct. 283, , 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228 (1964) ("Judicial inquiry under 
the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does not end with a showing 
of equal application among the members of the class defined by the 
legislation. The courts must reach and determine the question 
whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in 
light of its purpose . . . " ) . 
State uniform operation analysis is more rigorous than 
and will always meet or exceed the federal "rational basis" 
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standard. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp. , 752 
P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988). 
The gang enhancement statute does not have a reasonable 
tendency to further its legislative objectives. Given the purpose 
of the legislation, the classifications drawn in the statute are 
unreasonable. The gang enhancement is unconstitutional. 
The gang enhancement statute does not list its 
legislative objectives on its face. The legislative history, 
attached as addendum D, however, is abundantly clear: 
[T] he idea behind the enhanced penalties in California 
and the idea here was to get that center core, that's the 
core group of hardened criminals that supplies the money, 
supplies the impetus for a true criminal street gang. 
. . Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the social 
workers tell us that the only thing to do with them to 
allow social workers to work with the remainder of the 
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that 
hardened core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is 
designed for that purpose. . . . But this enhanced 
penalty, we have got to get that hard core of the street 
gang groups off of the streets, out of the street gangs. 
Id. at 3. 
This bill is directed at that core criminal element, that 
three percent of those six hundred gang members that have 
been identified that provide the father figure in these 
gangs. And they provide also the connection [with] the 
California gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine, 
the money that is fueling this explosion of gang activity 
in our cities and I'd like to ask you for your support 
for this bill and thank you for your time. 
Id. at 7. Debate in the Senate similarly indicates that the bill 
was designed to target criminal street gangs. Legislative History 
at 8. 
In the house debate, Representative Prante asked a 
question concerning the impact of the legislation on three persons 
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acting in concert who were not actual gang members. He was assured 
that that potential situation was covered by the definition in §76-
2-2025 and by judicial discretion to not impose the enhancement. 
Legislative History at 6. The gang enhancement is routinely being 
applied to persons who are not criminal street gang members, 
contrary to the purposes of the statute. 
The California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act," enacted in 1988, is found in Cal. Penal Code § 
186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996). Despite the concerns expressed by 
Rep. Rushton, thus far the statute has withstood constitutional 
challenge. People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal. Rptr. 
894 (1991); In re Alberto R.. 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 348 (1991). 
Unlike the California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act," Cal. Penal Code § 186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996), 
upon which our statue was based, the gang enhancement statute fails 
to meet its goals in a rational manner. Rather than designating 
the proper targets of the enhancement in the statute, the 
legislature attempted to rely on judicial discretion to ensure that 
non-gangmembers would not be sentenced under the enhancement. 
Because the statute fails to delineate the proper scope of its 
application, judges have been unable to carry into effect the 
intent of the legislature. The statute fails to further the goals 
5Section 76-2-202 obviously does not address the issue of gang 
membership in any fashion. 
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of the legislature in combatting the influx and proliferation of 
criminal street gangs in Utah. 
The gang enhancement, while intended to target the 
hardened core criminal element of criminal street gangs, sets apart 
a statutorily defined class of individuals who commit crimes in 
concert with 2 or more others. This group is immensely broader 
than the targeted group. The statutory classification here is not 
based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute. Since the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable and 
fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable. Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake, 
817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
191, 85 S.Ct. 283, , 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228 (1964). The gang 
enhancement should be stricken as unconstitutional. 
For the reasons just set forth, the gang enhancement is 
likewise arbitrary and capricious under a state due process 
analysis. E.g. State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 1988) 
(striking Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-21.5(4) (c) and -(d) as violative 
of the due process clause) . The gang enhancement should be struck 
as unconstitutional in violation of article I, section 7 of the 
Utah constitution. 
Under the federal scheme, if the statute deals with 
sensitive constitutional values or discriminates based on suspect 
classifications, the court will apply a heightened scrutiny of 
legislative means and ends, involving a real and thoughtful 
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examination of legislative purpose and the relationship between the 
legislation and that purpose. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P. 2d 572, 582 
(Utah 1993); State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (strict 
scrutiny test is used if a challenged classification is "suspect" 
or if a "fundamental interest" is involved); Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356, 358 (Utah 1989). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 affects fundamental rights 
embodied in the state and federal constitutions, including the 
right to jury trial, presumption of innocence, right to a 
preliminary hearing, and right to due process. Therefore, a strict 
scrutiny standard applies. Under the strict scrutiny standard, 
"classifications which might invade or restrain [fundamental 
rights] must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 
S.Ct. 1079, , 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 174 (1966). 
The gang enhancement fails federal strict scrutiny. 
While combatting criminal street gangs is a legitimate state 
interest, the statute is not narrowly drawn towards that purpose. 
Rather than applying strictly, or even primarily, to gangmembers, 
the statute applies to non-gangmembers. The gang enhancement 
violates federal equal protection, and should be stricken. 
C. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS. 
Section 76-3-203.1 is void for vagueness under a federal 
due process analysis. Basic principles of due process prohibit the 
enactment of a statute if it is vague on its face. 
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Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning." Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. [] 
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters 
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application." Third, but 
related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive 
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, "[] it "operates 
to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms."" 
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer 
far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."" 
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 
, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, , 75 
L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake. 817 
P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
Section 76-3-203.1(1)(b) provides that "'In concert with 
two or more persons' as used in this section means that the 
defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable 
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202." It is far from 
clear what the defendant's mental state must be. Section 76-2-202 
provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
While on its face this section does not seem to require that the 
defendant have any intent to engage in the conduct in concert with 
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others, as a matter of due process the State should not subject an 
individual to harsher punishment based on the random acts of 
others. Some element of intent, knowledge, or at least 
acquiescence in the aid of others must be required, although the 
statute fails to make this clear. 
The statute likewise does not specify the nature of its 
true intent. The statute was enacted to combat the criminal street 
gang problem in Utah, yet fails to recognize, identify, or define 
the problem at all. Compare Cal. Penal Code §186.20 et seq. 
(outlining legislative goals (§186.21), defining "pattern of 
criminal gang activity" (§186.22(e), and defining "criminal street 
gang" (§186.22(f))). California courts have relied on the 
specificity of the California statute in rejecting vagueness 
challenges. In re Alberto R. , 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 348 (1991); People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 8 94 (1991). The language of the statute here is vague, and 
fails to convey the statute's true intent. 
The Supreme Court has explained that the most critical 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is the requirement that 
legislatures provide sufficient guidelines concerning the 
application of a penal statute: 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to 
citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized 
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal 
element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Smith [v. Goguen] , 415 U.S. [566,] 574, 94 
S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 [(1974)]. Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a 
criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] 
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allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
personal predilections." Id., at 575. 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (footnote omitted). 
The primary failing of the gang enhancement statute is 
its complete failure to set guidelines concerning its proper 
application. Section 76-3-203.1 impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to judges for resolution on an ad hoc basis, as 
reflected in the legislative history and the text of the statute. 
Judges are expected to use their discretion in 
determining whether Section 76-3-203.1 applies, as reflected in 
Rep. Rushton's statements in the legislative history: 
[T] he sentencing judge, rather than the jury, shall 
decide whether to impose the penalty. We are not going 
to make any effort to take the judicial discretion out of 
this penalty phase. It will give the judge the right, if 
he feels that an individual needs to be taken out of that 
situation for this enhanced period of time, the judge 
still has the discretion to either take him out for an 
enhanced period of time or . . . not. 
Legislative history at 3 . In response to questions concerning the 
broad language of the statute, and whether persons who are not 
gangmembers could be convicted under the statute of "essentially 
gang activities", Rep. Rushton assured legislators that judges 
could be trusted to apply the statute in only the limited, gang-
related circumstances intended. Id. 
While the statute does in fact grant judges discretion to 
suspend application of the enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(6), it utterly fails to constrain or guide that discretion in 
any fashion. 
Justice Howe has described the hazards of such a statute: 
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It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could 
set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, 
and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at 
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the 
judicial for the legislative department of the 
government. 
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J., 
concurring) (quoting U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 
(1875)). Section 76-3-203.1 casts a large net and sweeps too 
broadly, without appropriate guidelines for the judges who are 
called upon to impose the enhancement. The gang enhancement 
statute should be declared void for vagueness. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
MR. LELEAE THE BENEFIT OF A LESS SEVERE 0-5 
YEAR SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY IN LIEU OF AN 
ENHANCED MINIMUM TERM OF 6 YEARS UNDER THE 
SHONDEL DOCTRINE. 
In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), the 
Supreme Court held that where two statutes proscribe the same 
conduct, the lesser penalty applies. The identical "in concert" 
conduct at issue here is proscribed by two statutes. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) applies an enhanced 6 year minimum term to 
second degree felonies committed under it. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
202(3) (Supp. 1998) provides that conspiracy to commit a second 
degree felony is a third degree felony. 
The same conduct that makes the gang enhancement 
applicable also renders one guilty of conspiracy. Conspiracy 
requires that a person, "intending that conduct constituting a 
crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage in or 
cause the performance of such conduct and any one of them commits 
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an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
4-2 01. Here, the facts as found by the jury and judge indicate 
that one or more persons (the two Seumanu brothers) intended that 
the crime be committed, all three acted in concert to commit the 
crime, and an overt act (indeed, accomplishment of the crime) 
occurred. Under Shondel, Mr. Leleae is entitled to the lesser 
penalty prescribed for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. 
Under the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of 
Mr. Leleae1s March 9, 1998 sentencing (see addendum E), the board 
of pardons would impose upon a person convicted of a second degree 
felony person crime a presumptive minimum sentence of 18, 21, 24, 
30, or 3 6 months, depending on criminal history assessment. A 
third degree felony person crime enhancement would be 6 months if 
concurrent, or 12 months if consecutive. Mr. Leleae was placed in 
the fair criminal history category, indicating a presumptive 
minimum sentence of 3 0 months. With a concurrent conspiracy 
sentence, his minimum sentence would be 3 years; a consecutive 
conspiracy sentence would make his sentence 3M years. Even in the 
worst case scenario of a person in the poor criminal history, the 
offender would receive a presumptive minimum sentence of 4 8 months 
if a consecutive conspiracy sentence was added. This is two years 
shorter than the minimum 6 year sentence provided under the gang 
enhancement.6 Instead of a minimum sentence of 6 years, due 
6Under the new Sentencing Guidelines effective October 15, 
1998 (see addendum F) , a similar result pertains. Mr. Leleae would 
be in criminal history category IV. A second degree felony person 
crime provides a presumptive total sentence of 48 months. A 
(continued...) 
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process and the Shondel doctrine mandate that Mr. Leleae receive 
instead a 0-5 year sentence as set forth by the conspiracy statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, Mr. Leleae respectfully requests 
that his conviction be reversed. ,, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of January, 1999. 
/) 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
6(...continued) 
concurrent conspiracy sentence would add 10% of 3 0 months, or 3 
months. A consecutive conspiracy sentence would add 40% of 30 
months, or 12 months. His sentence would be either 51 months (if 
concurrent) or 60 months (if consecutive), still shorter than the 
6 year (72 month) minimum term under the gang enhancement. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of 
the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
§ 76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms 
apply to this title: 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily 
injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily 
injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that 
creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
§ 76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force 
or violence, that causes or creates a substantial 
risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the 
person causes substantial bodily injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that 
the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to 
a violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) (a) is a 
second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is a third 
degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) provides: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses conunitted by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed 
in Subsection (4) in concert with two or more 
persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for 
the offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as 
used in this section means the defendant and 
two or more other persons would be criminally 
liable for the offense as parties under Section 
76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor 
cases or the information or indictment in 
felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided 
under this section. The notice shall be in a 
clause separate from and in addition to the 
substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included 
initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to 
include the subscription if the court finds the 
charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant 
of the allegation he committed the offense in 
concert with two or more persons, or if the 
court finds the defendant has not otherwise 
been substantially prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term 
of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other 
secure correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term 
of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other 
secure correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for 
which a life sentence is imposed, the convicted 
person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
20 years in prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, 
Chapter 37, 3 7a, 3 7b, or 3 7c, regarding 
drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined 
in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related 
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 
6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 
76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 
76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government 
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other 
violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and 
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 
10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in 
Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as 
defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons 
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in 
concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced 
penalty under this section. The imposition of 
the penalty is contingent upon a finding by the 
sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the 
court shall enter written findings of fact 
concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or 
execution of the sentence required under this section 
if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would 
be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances 
justifying the disposition on the record and in 
writing. 
Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded 
statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may 
require the introduction at that time of any other part 
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought 
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation. 
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of 
the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) 
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination 
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court 
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be 
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be 
necessary to develop the witness1 testimony. Ordinarily leading 
questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party 
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness 
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading 
questions. 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the 
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus 
such an additional number as will allow for all 
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge 
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, 
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time 
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective 
jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to supplement the examination by such further 
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
prospective jurors additional questions requested by 
counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or 
to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called 
to serve at a particular court or for the trial of 
a particular action. A challenge to the panel is 
an objection made to all jurors summoned and may 
be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be 
founded only on a material departure from the 
procedure prescribed with respect to the 
selection, drawing, summoning and return of 
the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel 
shall be taken before the jury is sworn and 
shall be in writing or recorded by the 
reporter. It shall specifically set forth 
the facts constituting the grounds of the 
challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel 
is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing 
may be had to try any question of fact upon 
which the challenge is based. The jurors 
challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the 
challenge. If the challenge to the panel is 
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury 
so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror 
may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only 
before the jury is sworn to try the action, except 
the court may, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any of 
the evidence is presented. In challenges for 
cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel 
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges 
for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution 
and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to 
a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital 
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is 
entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor 
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the 
court may allow the defendants additional peremptory 
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately 
or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more 
of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity 
which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured 
by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship between 
the prospective juror and any party, witness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or injured 
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds 
that the prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or 
employed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or 
having complained against or having been accused 
by him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury 
which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict 
was set aside, or which was discharged without a 
verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable 
with death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the 
juror from voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or employment, 
the carrying on of which is a violation of law, 
where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, 
either for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense 
charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; but 
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by 
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion 
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such 
jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be 
submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken 
first by the prosecution and then by the defense 
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed 
before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate 
jurors be impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order 
in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, 
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their 
duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have 
one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate 
juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same 
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same 
privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a 
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and is not 
a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall 
be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they 
and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
ADDENDUM B 
Portion of Mr. Leleae's statement, R. 4 02:30-31 
YOU KNOW WHAT, YOU TELL THE TRUTH, YOU DOIN SOMETHING YOU 
DON'T FEEL LIKE DOING, LIKE THIS SITUATION WHEN I WAS DRIVING 
AND YOU KNOW SOMETHING IS WRONG BUT YOU CAN'T DO NOTHING 
ABOUT IT BECAUSE YOU IN IT ALREADY, YOU KNOW. THAT'S THE ONLY 
FEELING THAT WAS HITTING ME WHEN THEY WERE BEATING UP THE 
MAN, YOU KNOW, WHEN I SEE THE TWO OF THEM GOING AT IT 
BEATING UP A MAN NOT EVEN A MAN JUST ANOTHER PERSON TOO, 
ANOTHER WHITE MANE WITH LONG HAIR, IT WASN'T REALLY HARD 
FOR ME TO TRY TO HOLD THEM BACK BECAUSE THEY ARE MY FRIENDS 
AND WHEN THEY BEAT THE MAN DOWN, YOU KNOW, WHAT MY 
FEELINGS WAS, YOU KNOW, SHOULD I HELP THEM BEAT UP THE MAN 
OR SHOULD I JUST STAND HERE, I DIDN'T WANT TO BE A PUNK AND 
JUST STAND THERE AND NOT DOING NOTHING AND THAT WAS THE 
ONLY THING ON MY MIND. D71 WASN'T THE ONE THAT WAS SHOOTING, 
I WASN'T THE ONE DRIVING, I WOULD PROBABLY OF BEAT THE MAN. I 
KNOW SINCE I TELL THE TRUTH, THAT EVERYBODY OVER THERE THAT 
SEEING THE THING, THE WITNESSES THAT WERE OVER THERE THAT 
WOULD RECOGNIZE ME FROM WHEN THEY WERE BEATING UP THE 
MAN, THEY KNOW THAT I WASN'T LAYING A HAND ON NOBODY THAT I 
WAS TRYING TO HOLD MY BOY BACK, THE BIG ONE, THE ONE OWNED 
THE CAR. THIS WAS ENOUGH YOU KNOW OTHER PEOPLE AROUND. I 
KNOW THAT I WAS DRUNK YOU KNOW. BUT THEN AGAIN I KNOW 
-30-
WHAT I WAS DOING. 
WELL I APPRECIATE YOU TELLING US THE TRUTH. IT MAKES IT 
EASIER TO FIGURE THINGS OUT BECAUSE THINGS JUST WEREN'T 
FITTING TOGETHER. JOHN AT THIS TIME, WE ARE GOING TO GO BACK 
AND TALK TO ONE OF THE OTHER GUYS TO SEE IF HE WILL COME 
CLEAN AND TALK TO US. WE ARE GOING TO PUT YOU BACK INTO THE 
ROOM FOR A FEW MINUTES AND THEN WE WILL LET YOU KNOW WHAT 
WE ARE GOING TO DO. O.K.? 
THIS WILL CONCLUDE THIS INTERVIEW THE TIME IS 0252 HOURS. 
-31-
ADDENDUM C 
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, R. 351-2 
3rd DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Case No: 971900804 FS 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Date: March 9, 1998 
PRESENT 
Prosecutor: CY H CASTLE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LISA J. REMAL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 27, 1972 
Cleric: daleeng 
Reporter: DOROTHY TRIPP 
CHARGES 
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 12/01/1997 {Guilty - Jury} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Defendant to receive credit for time served. Restitution ordered 
Page 1 
Case No: 971900804 
Date: Mar 09, 1998 
in the amounts of $446.00 and $300.00. 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT 
Due to being gang related, an enhancement of severity on charge 1 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT is enhanced from 2nd Degree Felony to 2nd Degree 
Felony. Additional time sentenced is 6 years. 
Dated this / day of ^)%dSt*^^ ^W <f^. 
(TYRONE E. MEDLEY ,y 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
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ADDENDUM D 
Gang Enhancement legislative history 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52/ OTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-203.1/ THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT POR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE 
OR MORE PERSONS* 
Legislative History: 
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann* section 
76-3-203.1/ and referred to in L. 1990/ ch. 207 section 1/ was 
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990, and became 
effective on April 23, 1990• 
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature 
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only 
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute 
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and 
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the 
Utah State Capitol. 
Bouse Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
February 21/ 1990 
Speaker of the House: 
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52? Representative 
Rushton. 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah/ this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this 
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot 
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly 
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Utah County. 
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all 
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are 
coming into Utah. There's several reasons why there's such 
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in Utah. The main 
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in 
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's 
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred 
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in 
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars 
an ounce in some rural cities in Utah we'll get as much as 
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This 
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the 
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The 
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot 
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've 
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been 
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone 
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them, 
the graffiti/ ahr when I was a boy thirty five years agof 
there were street gangs in salt Lake City. Ah, but they 
they weren't the serious problem chat they are becoming now 
with the introduction of crack cocaine* Ah, police 
departments estimate that in the Salt Lake valley now there 
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these 
California style street gangs, of that six hundred, it is 
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs, 
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all 
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty 
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to 
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three 
percent of this group are hardened criminals with 
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I 
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in 
existence in my own neighborhood in Hagna, and West Valley, 
I become quite alarmed. It's a scary thought when we know 
what happened to the Bronx in Hew York in the sixties 
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy 
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up 
from the law enforcement and levelled* One of the most 
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City, 
er, the Bronx in New rork was three hundred and seventy 
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods, 
as they call them in New York, and those buildings were 
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the 
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the 
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of 
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have 
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will 
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the 
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that 
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham 
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last 
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's 
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in 
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in 
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act." 
We brought a copy of that act to Otah, we got a lot of 
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that 
patterned the Street Terrorism Act* But since that time, 
that act has run into constitutional problems in 
California, so we had representatives from SWAP, do a lot 
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with 
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the 
croQp criminal activities penalty, which they feel 
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the 
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool. 
It doesn't have the political or the psychological effects 
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used the 
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill, 
and they told us this was the reason why it would become 
constitutionally unsound. So, if you read the bill it will 
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it 
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with 
labelling people by name. It isf looks benign, "Group 
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the 
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want 
for tools to be used against street gang prolification 
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act, 
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides 
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that 
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes 
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in 
this second, the second page describes the enhanced 
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in 
California and the idea here was to get that center core, 
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies 
the money, supplies the impetus for a true .criminal street 
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street 
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world 
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the 
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them 
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the 
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened 
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for 
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the 
enhanced penalties. The third page is a list of crimes 
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of 
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried 
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at 
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a 
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are 
something that has to be proven that there's a need for 
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced 
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for 
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to 
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the 
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the 
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page 
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the 
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are 
not going to make any effort to take the judicial 
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the 
judge the right, if he feels that that individual ne^ds to 
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of 
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him 
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't 
use hi~m - take this person out for enhanced period of time 
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and 
thac it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief 
Association and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a 
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask, 
answer, any questions, ah, ... 
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Speaker of the House: 
Representatives to the bill. Representative Millner? 
Representative Millner: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. First of all, I'd like to declare 
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I 
thought I'd get your attention with that. Urn, I happen to 
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are 
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in 
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities, 
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our 
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, urn, good for the 
neighborhood, and urn, ah, we tried to take on little 
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill, 
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have, 
and that it that many times we have failed in our society 
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to 
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people 
who come from broken homes and who don't have the 
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems, 
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a 
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young 
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try 
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of 
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand 
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a 
message. And that message is that we need to provide 
opportunities for these young people, educational 
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get 
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into 
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill, 
thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Hales? 
Representative Hales: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support 
of this very important legislation. I have a good citizen 
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game 
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Otah is one 
of these, and he said in the past three or four months, 
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah, 
Shopko, Smith's Pood Xing, as much as thirty thousand 
dollars in just a very short period of time. But be said 
in addition to the theft, and the property damage that has 
occurred, be has been really concerned about the 
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often 
-these thefts occur during the time that the stores are 
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on, 
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of 
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't 
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood 
children that Representative Hillner has talked about, 
although it could be. Ah, they say that these groups are 
sophisticated enough that they know what the state lavs 
are, and very often they will move around according to what 
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this 
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your 
support of this legislation. I think it's really important 
and I have ay hat off to those who've, a Senator Fordham 
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank 
you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative, ah, Tuttie? 
Representative Tuttie: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill 
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an 
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the 
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either 
copycatting the groups in California or members, and I 
think it's well needed and I think we should support this. 
Thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Bush? 
Representative Bush: 
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this . 
bill and I would ... Representative...sorry, Representative 
Rushton and Senator Fordham for looking into this. There's 
no sensB waiting until our state becomes like some of these 
other areas of the country before we start doing something 
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell, 
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important 
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend them for it 
and ask you to support it. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Prante? 
Representative Prante: 




Speaker of the House: 
Sponsor yields, proceed. 
S 
Representative Prante: 
He's sitting right next to me, but I just want this 
clarified for myself. It's bard to ask him when he's on 
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm all for 
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps, 
ah, Representative Rushton can respond to it, is that when 
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people 
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and 
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering 
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't 
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and 
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them? 
Representative Rushton: 
The answer to these question probably would be better 
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is 
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about 
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also 
will fall, the problem that be talks about if if just two 
people commit burglary together does this constitute group 
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be. 
You got the two people and the individual, the individual 
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I 
think that the best cover here is in the judicial 
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the 
definition of concert action between these people • a legal 
definition. 
Representative Prante: 
Where's the definition? 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the 
judicial. 
Representative Prante: 
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to 
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion? 
Representative Rushton: 
I don't have my book with me. 
Representative Prante: 
Oh. Okay-* Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My 
concern isn't with what itfs doing, it's with, what if two 
people .steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people 
impossibly/ impulsively take something from a home, are 
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? ... 




Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Fuller? 
Representative Fuller: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Call for a previous question? 
Speaker of the House: 
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the 
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no1? Motion 
carries. Representative Rushton", you may sum up. 
Representative Rushton: 
Z could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood 
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with 
the blue skull cap of the California Crips 'gang in your 
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand 
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core, 
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at 
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap 
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each 
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang 
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at 
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed ac 
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six 
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide 
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also 
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the 
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of 
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for 
your support for this bill and thank you for your time. 
Speaker of the House: 
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the 
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on 
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received SI affirmative 
and no negative votes gasses this House. 
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Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
January 23 and 24, 1990 
January 23, 1990 
Senator Fordham: 
Ah# Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important 
bill. Ah, we've worked on this bill since the middle of 
the summer/ worked with the Attorney General's Office, with 
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions 
of enforcement in this state. Originally/ we had a bill 
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with 
California, who this bill was patterned after, their bill, 
and after they passed their law, we bad an influx of gang 
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otab 
and establishing residence here and working as ab in their 
organization as members of, who had broken off from the 
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to 
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in 
Utah. Now we've bad, in working with California, their 
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a 
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed 
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves 
when two or more commit a crime, then they're subject to 
the penalties that are made in this law. And ab let me 
just read what, quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor, 
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive 
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a 
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a 
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced 
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If 
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years 
in prison. And if the. offense is a first degree felony, 
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term 
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very 
restrictrive [sic], and these, ab these charges would be 
administered and sentenced by the judge without always 
going to a jury bearing. It would depend on the ab crime 
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I bave many 
clippings, too many to go over, let me just read you the 
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning 
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in 
school, ah Kearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting 
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year. 
•Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new 
cancrr" "Gang fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang 
fires on a family, two die." "Spray painted grafitti," and 
this bill covers those acts, that if it's this kind of 
destruction of property is committed by two or more people, 
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something 
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with 
the prosecutors, tbey felt that it was very difficult under 
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs. 
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California, in working with then and talking with them, ah, 
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're 
developing this one in Utah. It would be such more 
enforceable by them* How I might just: show you the volume 
here is the California gang law that: they have. So if 
there are any questions that I could respond to, I'd be 
glad to, Mr. President. 
President: of the Senate: 
Senator Chuck Peterson? 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is 
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and 
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill "apply to 
juveniles under eighteen? 
Senator Fordham: 
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or 
more persons. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the 
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not 
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would 
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a 
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do 
that. Senator Hillyard? 
Senator Hillyard: 
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact 
that there's three of us here together and that may 
constitute a criminal gang. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's for sure. I think it does. Yeah, I, there's no 
question about that. 
Senator Hillyard: 
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in 
that section would override this unless there is a specific 
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law. I was not 
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had 
another conflict that took me out of these bills. I have 
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a 
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could 
answer. 
President of the-Senate: 
Senator Steel? 
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Senator S t e e l e : 
Thank you, Mr. President, I have a question as i t re la te to 
ah, r e la t e s to a potential in our s ta te of moving towards 
what's termed in many s t a t e s , "shock incarceration". In 
quick summary, as a l i s t i n g , f i r s t time f e l o n s , for 
example, ages eighteen through twenty s i x are placed in 
some s t a t e s in a ninety day incarceration boot camp 
environment. The recidivism, the impact on those 
part icular individuals in the c i t e s that I noted, I ' v e had 
discuss ion with, seems to be very e f f e c t i v e and very 
appealing and our s ta te i s looking as poss ib le a l ternat ives 
to what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my 
quest ion, these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that 
process? 
Senator Pordham: 
I don't think that i t would circumvent i t , I think they 
would be part of . The judge has the authority to say where 
these individuals would be incarcerated or be subjected to 
review or whatever, as I understand i t , the judge would be 
able to put these people where they, where he f e l t that i t 
would be the most good for them. 
Pres ident of the Senate: 
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are 
you voting on that o n e . . . I don't see any further questions 
then. 
Unident i f ied speaker: 
I move for' the adoption of the b i l l . 
Pres ident of the Senate: 
Question has been cal led, for the question sha l l Senate 
B i l l 52 be read for the third time? 
[Senators vote ora l ly ] 
Senate B i l l 52 shows twenty f ive ayes, no nays, four being absent, 
the b i l l pas se s , to be placed on the third reading calendar. 
January 24 , 1990 
Pres ident of the Senate: 
Senator McCallister? 
Senator Pordham — 
Personal p w v i l e g e Mr. 
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ADDENDUM F 
New Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines 
(Effective October 15, 1998) 
F0RM1 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
These are guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender. 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS 0 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 1 
(INCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS) 2 
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 3 
4 
PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 0 
(ADJUDICATIONS FOR OFFENSES THAT 1 
WOULD HAVE BEEN FELONIES IF 2 
COMMITTED BY AN ADULT)(THREE 3 
MISDEMEANOR ADJUDICATIONS EQUAL 4 





MORE THAN THREE 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO TO FOUR 
FIVE TO SEVEN 
MORE THAN SEVEN 
NONE 
ONE 
TWO TO FOUR 
MORE THAN FOUR 
SECURE PLACEMENT 
VIOLENCE HISTORY 
(PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT CONVICTION 
FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH INCLUDES USE 
OF A WEAPON, PHYSICAL FORCE. 
THREAT OF FORCE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE) 
WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT OFFENSE 
(ONLY WHEN CURRENT CONVICTION 
DOES NOT REFLECT WEAPON USE OR 
WHEN STATUTORY ENHANCEMENT IS 
NOT INVOLVED) 













3rd DEGREE FELONY 
2nd DEGREE FELONY 
1st DEGREE FELONY 
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
ACTUAL POSSESSION 




(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
SUPERVISION RISK 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
0 NO PRIOR SUPERVISION 
1 PRIOR SUPERVISION 
2 PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
3 PRIOR REVOCATION 
4 ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURRENT 
SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
0 NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS 
1 FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFFENSE) OR OUTSTANDING WARRANT 
2 ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
3 ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM 
4 ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT 









4 - 7 
0 - 3 
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CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS: 40% of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS: 10% of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
Matrix timeframes refer to imprisonment only. Refer to the categorization of offenses. 
Capital offenses are not considered within the context of the sentencing guidelines. 
ACTIVE CONVICTIONS CRIME CATEGORY TIME 
MOST SERIOUS 
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ADDENDUM 6 
Order denying defendant's motion challenging 
constitutionality of section 76-3-203.1 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CY H. CASTLE, 4808 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION CHALLENGING 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 
76-3-203.1 
(f&( Case No. 9719OB04FS 
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant's Motion Challenging the Constitutionality of 
Section 96-3-203.1 came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley on March 9, 1998, at 8:30 a.m. Cy H. Castle, 
Deputy District Attorney, represented plaintiff, State of Utah; 
Lisa J. Remal of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Associations 
represented the defendant, John LeLeae, who was present. 
Defendant argued at the hearing and in his memorandum that 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 was unconstitutional for the reasons 
that it violates defendant's right to a jury trial, due process, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and equal protection because the 
statue is a separate offense from the underlying offense for 
which defendant was convicted. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SECTION 76-3-203.1 
Case No. 97190804FS 
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Defendant further argued that the court could not impose the 
enhanced penalty because his conduct is governed by two different 
statutes -- conspiracy and gang enhancement -- and the state 
cannot elect to punish him under the gang enhancement because it 
imposes a more severe penalty. 
The State responded by arguing that the group enhancement 
was constitutional and not a separate offense because it is a 
sentencing provision with the objective of punishing more 
severely those who engage in group criminal activity. 
Based upon the arguments of counsel, the memoranda filed by 
the parties, consideration of the case law, legislative history 
and language of section 76-3-2 03.1, defendant's motion to declare 
section 76-3-203.1 unconstitutional is denied for the following 
reasons: 
1. Defendant is not entitled to a jury determination of 
whether he has violated section 76-3-203.1 because it neither 
constitutes a separate criminal offense nor defines additional 
elements for the underlying offense, but instead is a sentencing 
provision. As such, defendant's conduct in this case is not 
controlled by two different statutes. This conclusion is 
supported by the explicit language of the statute and holding of 
State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
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2. The group enhancement statue does not require a jury to 
determine "in concert'' mental culpability, or provide for 
penalties in excess of those imposed for the underlying offense. 
Therefore, defendant's due process right is not violated by the 
trial court's finding facts to support the imposition of the 
enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. 
3. Section 76-3-203.1 is not void-for-vagueness and 
susceptible to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement or 
overbroad. The statute defines the circumstances in which an 
enhancement is imposed in terms of a well-established party 
liability statute. 
4. Section 76-3-203.1 is not overboard because it does not 
prohibit any form of association, other than a group that acts to 
commit crime. 
5. Section 76-3-203.1 does not violate defendant's right 
to equal protection or uniform operation of the law. The 
statutory classification, clearly identifying those persons whose 
sentences should be enhanced, demonstrates a reasonable tendency 
to advance the legislative and statutory objective of curtailing 
the increased risks of harmful consequences connected with group 
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criminal activity. 
DATED this f day of May, 1998. 
COURT: 
\,**€SL< 
Tyyyne E. Medley 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Lisa J. Remal 
Attorney for defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Deny Defendant's Motion Challenging 
Constitutionality of Section 76-3-203.1 was delivered to Lisa J. 
Remal, Attorney for Defendant JOHN LELEAE, at 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the V ** day of April, 
1998. 
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